




Abstract— This article describes the philosophy, design, and 
prototype implementation of an operator override system 
intended for use in managing unmanned robotic systems capable 
of lethal behavior. The ethical ramifications associated with the 
responsibility assignment of such a system are presented, which 
guide the development of the proof-of-concept system that serves 
as the basis for the simulation results presented herein. 
 
Index Terms—Autonomous Robots, Robot Ethics, Operator 
overrides 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE advent of autonomous lethal robotic systems is well 
underway and it is a simple matter of time before 
autonomous engagements of targets are present on the 
battlefield.  Currently, a human operator remains in the loop 
for decision-making regarding the deployment of lethal force, 
but the trend is clear that targeting decisions are being moved 
forward as autonomy of these systems progresses.  Thus it is 
time to confront hard issues surrounding the use of such 
systems.  
   We have previously discussed [1-4] the philosophy, 
motivation, and basis for an autonomous robotic system 
architecture potentially capable of adhering to the 
International Laws of War (LOW) and Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) to ensure that these systems conform to the legal 
requirements and responsibilities of a civilized nation. This 
article specifically focuses on one aspect of the overall 
architecture (Figure 1), that part of the responsibility advisor 
which deals with operator overrides of lethal engagements.  
II. RELATED WORK 
The debate of the appropriateness and legality of lethal 
autonomous systems is well underway. Sparrow [5] argues 
that any use of “fully autonomous” robots is unethical due to 
the Jus in Bello requirement that someone must be responsible 
for a possible war crime. He contends that while responsibility 
could ultimately vest in the commanding officer 
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Figure 1. Ethical Architecture (See [4] for details) 
for the system’s use, it would be unjust to both that individual 
and any resulting casualties in the event of a violation. 
Nonetheless, due to the increasing tempo of warfare, he shares 
our opinion that the eventual deployment of systems with ever 
increasing autonomy is inevitable without legal intervention. 
We agree that it is necessary that responsibility for the use of 
these systems must be made clear, but do not agree that it is 
infeasible to do so.  
   Asaro [6] similarly argues from a position of loss of 
attribution of legal responsibility, which he states will compel 
roboticists to build ethical systems in the future.  One of the 
earliest arguments encountered based upon the difficulty to 
attribute responsibility and liability to autonomous agents in 
the battlefield was presaged by Perri [7]. He assumes “at the 
very least the rules of engagement for the particular conflict 
have been programmed into the machines, and that only in 
certain types of emergencies are the machines expected to set 
aside these rules”. While he rightly notes the inherent 
difficulty in attributing responsibility to the programmer, 
designer, soldier, commander, or politician for the potential of 
war crimes by these systems, we believe that a deliberate 
assumption of responsibility by human agents for these 
systems’ actions can at least help focus such an assignment 
when required. A central part of the architecture in this article 
is a responsibility advisor, which specifically addresses these 
issues, although it would be naïve to say it will solve all of 
them. Often assigning and establishing responsibility for 
human war crimes, even through International Courts, is quite 
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daunting.    
   Walzer [8] recognizes four distinct cases regarding the 
military’s adherence to the Laws of War: 
1. LOW are ignored under the “pressure of a utilitarian 
argument.” 
2. A slow erosion of the LOW due to “the moral urgency 
of the cause” occurs, where the enemies’ rights are 
devalued and the friendly forces’ rights are enhanced. 
3. LOW is strictly respected whatever the consequences. 
4. The LOW is overridden, but only in the face of an 
“imminent catastrophe.” 
     We contend that autonomous robotic systems should 
adhere to case 3, but potentially allow for an override 
capability referred to in case 4, where only humans are 
involved in the override and take full responsibility for their 
actions.  
    Although states rarely begin wars with the intention of 
civilian victimization, several reasons for its eventual 
acceptance by governmental or military authorities include 
desperation to win, desperation to save the lives of military 
forces, or a tactic of later resort, none of which are justified 
according to the LOW [9]. By purposely designing the 
autonomous system to strictly adhere to the LOW, this helps 
to scope responsibility, in the event of an immoral action by 
the agent. Regarding overriding the fundamental human rights 
afforded by the Laws of War, Walzer notes:  
These rights, I shall argue, cannot be eroded or undercut; 
nothing diminishes them, they are still standing at the very 
moment they are overridden: that is why they have to be 
overridden. … The soldier or statesman who does so must 
be prepared to accept the moral consequences and the 
burden of guilt that his action entails. At the same time, it 
may well be that he has no choice but to break the rules: he 
confronts at last what can meaningfully be called necessity. 
III. RESPONSIBILITY ADVISEMENT 
     The ability and resulting responsibility for committing an 
override of a fundamental legal and ethical limit should not be 
vested in the autonomous system itself. Instead it is the 
province of a human commander or statesman, where they 
must be duly warned of the consequences of their action by 
the autonomous agent that is so restrained. Nonetheless, a 
provision for such an override mechanism of the Laws of War 
may perhaps be appropriate in the design of a lethal 
autonomous system, but this should not be easily invoked and 
must require multiple confirmations by different humans in 
the chain of command before a lethal robot is unleashed from 
its constraints.  
   In effect, the issuance of a command override changes the 
status of the machine from an autonomous robot to that of a 
robot serving as an extension of the warfighter, and in so 
doing the operator(s) must accept all responsibility for their 
actions. These are defined as follows [10]: 
• Robot acting as an extension of a human soldier: a robot 
under the direct authority of a human, especially 
regarding the use of lethal force. 
• Autonomous robot: a robot that does not require direct 
human involvement, except for high-level mission 
tasking; such a robot can make its own decisions 
consistent with its mission without requiring direct human 
authorization, especially regarding the use of lethal force. 
    If overrides are to be permitted, they must use a variant of 
the two-key safety precept [11], but slightly modified for 
overrides: 
DSP-Override: The overriding of ethical control of 
autonomous lethal weapon systems shall require a 
minimum of two independent and unique validated 
messages in the proper sequence from two different 
authorized command entities, each of which shall be 
generated as a consequence of separate authorized entity 
action. Neither message should originate within the 
Unmanned System launching platform. 
     The management and validation of this precept is a 
function of the architecture’s responsibility advisor [12,4]. If 
an override is accepted, the system must generate a message 
that logs the event and transmit it to legal counsel, both within 
the U.S. military and to international authorities. Certainly this 
assists in making the decision to override the LOW a well-
considered one by an operator, simply by recognizing the 
potential consequences of immediate notification to the 
powers-that-be of the use of potentially illegal force. This 
operator knowledge further reinforces responsibility 
acceptance for the use of lethal force, especially when 
unauthorized by the ethical governor [13,4].  
   A crucial design criterion and associated design component, 
the Responsibility Advisor, must make clear and explicit as 
best as possible, just where responsibility vests, should: (1) an 
unethical action be undertaken by the autonomous robot as a 
result of an operator/commander override; or (2) the robot 
performs an unintended unethical act due to some 
representational deficiency in the constraint set or in its 
application either by the operator or within the architecture 
itself. To do so requires not only suitable training of operators 
and officers as well as appropriate architectural design, but 
also an on-line system that generates awareness to soldiers and 
commanders alike about the consequences of the deployment 
of a lethal autonomous system. It must be capable of providing 
reasonable explanations for its actions regarding lethality, 
including refusals to act.  
   Certainly the agent should never intend to conduct a 
forbidden lethal action, and although an action may be 
permissible, it should also be deemed obligatory in the context 
of the mission (military necessity) to determine whether or not 
it should be undertaken. So in this sense, we argue that any 
lethal action undertaken by an unmanned system must be 
obligatory and not solely permissible, where the mission ROE 
define the situation-specific lethal obligations of the agent and 
the LOW define absolutely forbidden lethal actions. Although 
it is conceivable that permissibility alone for the use of 
lethality is adequate, we will require the provision of 
additional mission constraints explicitly informing the system 
regarding target requirements (e.g., as part of the ROE) to 
define exactly what constitutes an acceptable action in a given 
mission context. This assists with the assignment of 
responsibility for the use of lethality. Laws of War and related 
ROE determine what are absolutely forbidden lethal actions; 
and Rules of Engagement mission requirements determine 
what is obligatory lethal action, i.e., where and when the agent 




   “If there are recognizable war crimes, there must be 
recognizable criminals” [8]. The theory of justice argues that 
there must be a trail back to the responsible parties for such 
events. While this trail may not be easy to follow under the 
best of circumstances, we need to ensure that accountability is 
built into the ethical architecture of an autonomous system to 
support such needs.  On a related note, does a lethal 
autonomous agent have a right, even a responsibility, to refuse 
an unethical order? The answer is an unequivocal yes. 
“Members of the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful 
orders” [14]. What if the agent is incapable of understanding 
the ethical consequences of an order, which indeed may be the 
case for an autonomous robot? That is also spoken to in 
military doctrine: It is a defense to any offense that the 
accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew 
the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and 
understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful 
[15]. 
   That does not absolve the guilt from the party that issued the 
order in the first place. During the Nuremberg trials it was not 
sufficient for a soldier to merely show that he was following 
orders to absolve him from personal responsibility for his 
actions. Two other conditions had to be met [16]: (1) The 
soldier had to believe the action to be morally and legally 
permissible; and (2) The soldier had to believe the action was 
the only morally reasonable action available in the 
circumstances. For an ethical robot it should be fairly easy to 
satisfy and demonstrate that these conditions hold due to the 
closed world assumption, i.e., the robot’s beliefs can be well-
known and characterized, and perhaps even inspected 
(assuming the existence of explicit representations and not 
including learning robots in this discussion). Thus the 
responsibility returns to those who designed, deployed, and 
commanded the autonomous agent to act, as they are those 
who controlled its beliefs. 
   Matthias [17] speaks to the difficulty in ascribing 
responsibility to an operator of a machine that employs 
learning algorithms since the operator is no longer in principle 
capable of predicting the future behavior of that agent any 
longer. The use of subsymbolic machine learning is not 
currently advocated at this time for any of the ethical 
architectural components. We accept the use of inspectable 
changes by the lone adaptive component used within the 
ethical components of the architecture, (i.e., the ethical 
adaptor [18]). This involves change in the explicit set of 
constraints that governs the system’s ethical performance. 
Matthias notes “as long as there is a symbolic representation 
of facts and rules involved, we can always check the stored 
information and, should this be necessary, correct it.” We 
contend that by explicitly informing and explaining to the 
operator, an informed decision by the operator can be made as 
to the system’s responsible use. Matthias concludes that “if we 
want to avoid the injustice of holding men responsible for 
actions of machines over which they could not have sufficient 
control, we must find a way to address the responsibility gap 
in moral practice and legislation.” The responsibility advisor is 
intended to make explicit to the operator of an ethical agent 
the responsibilities and choices he/she is confronted with 
when deploying autonomous systems capable of lethality. 
Responsibility acceptance occurs at multiple levels within the 
architecture: 
1. Command authorization of the system for a particular 
mission. 
2. Override responsibility acceptance. 
3. Authoring of the constraint set that provides the basis for 
implementing the LOW and ROE, which entails 
responsibility – both from the ROE author and by the 
diligent translation by a second party into a machine 
recognizable format. It should be noted that failures in the 
accurate description, language, or conveyance of the ROE 
to a soldier have often been responsible or partially 
responsible for the unnecessary deaths of soldiers or 
violations of the LOW [19]. Mechanisms for verification, 
validation, and testing must be an appropriate part of any 
plan to deploy such systems. 
4. Verification that only military personnel are in charge of 
the system. Only military personnel (not civilian trained 
operators) have the legal authority to conduct lethal 
operations in the battlefield. 
   The remainder of this paper focuses primarily on (2) above: 
the use of operator controlled overrides (see [12,4] for a 
discussion of the other issues). 
IV. DESIGN FOR OVERRIDING ETHICAL CONTROL 
   Overriding means changing the system’s ability to use lethal 
force, either by allowing it when it was forbidden by the 
ethical governor [13] or by denying it when it has been 
enabled. As stated earlier, overriding the forbidding ethical 
constraints of the autonomous system should only be done 
with the utmost certainty on the part of the operator. To do so 
at runtime requires a direct “two-key” mechanism, with coded 
authorization by two separate individuals, ideally the operator 
and his immediate superior. The inverse situation, denying the 
system the ability to fire, does not require a two-key test, and 
can be done directly from the operator console. This is more 
of an emergency stop scenario, should the system be prepared 
to engage a target that the operator deems inappropriate for 
whatever reasons, even if it is considered ethically appropriate 
and obligated to engage by the autonomous system. 
The functional equivalent of an override is the negation of the 
Permission-To-Fire {PTF) variable that is normally directly 
controlled by the ethical architecture [4]. This operator 
override action allows the weapons systems to be fired even if 
it is not obligated to do so (setting PTF from False to True), 
potentially leading to operator-induced atrocities or 
eliminating the robot’s obligated right to fire if the operator 
thinks it is acting in error or for other reasons (setting PTF 
from True to False).  Table 1 captures these relationships. 
  From a design perspective, in case 2, the operator must be 
advised and presented with the forbidden constraints he/she is 
potentially violating. Permission to override in case 2 requires 
a coded two-key release by two separate operators, each going 
through the override procedure independently. Each violated 
constraint is presented to the operator with an accompanying 
text explanation for the reasoning behind the perceived 
violation and any relevant expert case opinion that may be 
available. This explanation process may proceed, at the 




Laws of War if requested. The operator must then 
acknowledge understanding each violation and explicitly 
check each one off separately prior to granting an override for 
the particular constraints being rescinded. One or more 
constraints may be removed by the operator at their discretion. 
After the override is granted, automated notification of the 
override is sent immediately to higher authorities for 
subsequent review 
TABLE 1: Override to Permission-to-fire Mappings 








1. F (do not fire) F (no 
override) 
F (do not 
fire) 
System does not fire 
as it is not overridden 
2. F (do not fire) T (override) T (able to 
fire) 
Operator commands 








T (able to 
fire) 
System is obligated to 
fire 
4. T (permission to 
fire) 





   Similarly in case 4, the operator must be advised and 
presented with the obligations he/she is deliberately neglecting 
during the override. One or all of these obligating constraints 
may be rescinded. As case 4 concerns preventing the use of 
lethal force by the autonomous system, the operator can be 
granted instantaneous authority to set the Permission-to-Fire 
variable’s value to FALSE, without requiring a prior 
explanation process, serving as a form of emergency stop for 
weapon release. The explanation process can then occur ex 
post facto as needed. 
   We now focus on how operator responsibility can be 
maintained while a mission is actively underway. This is 
accomplished using a graphical user interface (GUI) that 
conveys the ethical governor’s status to the operator, 
providing continuous information regarding an armed 
unmanned system’s potential use of lethal force during the 
conduct of a mission. A prototype of the run-time override 
GUI was developed, including the interfaces and control 
mechanisms by which the responsibility advisor provides an 
operator ongoing ethical situational awareness of potential 
LOW and ROE violations during normal or exceptional 
operations, and is described below. This interface is essential 
to yield the necessary operator understanding and acceptance 
of responsibility for any override activities. Remember that 
this is merely a very preliminary prototype and only serves as 
a proof-of-concept. Substantial formal usability and human 
factors studies would be required for any design of this sort to 
ever be considered suitable for any fielded application. As 
such, view this prototype as illustrative but not prescriptive. 
A. Continuous Presentation of the Status of the Ethical 
Governor 
   The ethical governor’s graphical user interface has become 
an integrated part of the mission console of MissionLab1 
[20,21]. Appearing as a prototype window in the upper right-
hand corner of the run-time display, it constantly provides the 
 
1 MissionLab is freely available for research and educational purposes at: 
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/research/MissionLab/ 
operator feedback regarding the status of lethal action by an 
autonomous robot during a combat mission (Fig. 2). Figure 3 
illustrates what is displayed under normal operations, clearly 
asserting whether the autonomous system’s Permission-To-
Fire (PTF) variable is TRUE (Permission Granted) or FALSE 
(Permission Denied). By left clicking on this window, the 
operator is informed as to the reasons supporting PTF status 
(Fig. 4).   
B. Negative Overrides: Denying Permission to Fire in the 
presence of obligating constraints 
   Should an obligated, not prohibited, and clearly 
discriminated target be acquired whereby the PTF variable is 
set to TRUE, the ethical governor has completed its analysis 
and the system is about to engage the target. Prior to this 
autonomous response, the operator is informed of the 
impending action and given a finite time window (initially set 
to 10 seconds in this prototype) to allow for a possible 
intervention via a negative override, preventing an 
autonomous weapons discharge. Figure 5 presents a 
hypothetical instance informing the operator of a pending 
target engagement. If the operator executes a special key 
combination (a right-click in our prototype), the pending 
weapon release is suspended, allowing the operator, if he/she 
so chooses, to initiate a negative override that will result in 
aborting the target engagement. This is termed a negative 
override since the operator effectively sets the PTF variable to 
FALSE by his/her actions. Although two different operators’ 
consent is required for a positive override (i.e., a two-key 
system), only a single operator is required to disengage from a 
target, since not firing poses no potential ethical violation of 
the LOW. A negative override is analogous to an emergency 
stop of the weapon system. 
   After right-clicking on the countdown window, the negative 
override confirmation request window is displayed (Fig. 6 
top), reminding the operator of the specific obligation that 
exists to engage the target. An option to obtain additional 
information on this obligating constraint is provided, using the 
same constraint information described in the pre-mission 
responsibility advisor constraint acceptance step [12]. The 
operator must then confirm whether or not an override should 
be granted. Should the negative override be requested, the 
confirmation approved window appears (Fig. 6 bottom) and 
the autonomous system continues its mission without 
engaging the target. 
A. Positive Overrides:  Granting Permission to Fire in the 
presence of forbidding ethical constraints 
   Positive overrides, where the operator sets the PTF variable 
to TRUE when the ethical governor had determined that it 
should be FALSE, are considerably more complex as they 





Figure 2. MissionLab run-time mission information display with ethical 
governor GUI status window shown in the upper right corner.  
 
      




Figure 5. Operator window displaying countdown to autonomous weapon 





Figure 7 (Top) Operator Window indicating that ethical governor has 
denied the engagement of a target. (Bottom) Explanation for denial with 




Figure 4. Left Clicking on the status window (Fig. 4) displays an 
explanation for PTF status. The obligation explanation (top) is presented 





Figure 6. Negative operator override. (Top) Confirmation Request 
window (Bottom) Confirmation Approved Window 
 
Responsibility acceptance by the operator is a very serious 
matter. It is essential that the positive override process be well 
considered on the part of the operator and that all information 
at the disposal of the ethical governor be made available as 
part of his/her decision-making. Thus several deliberate 
barriers are introduced to ensure that the operator is fully 
informed prior to engaging in a situation that the governor has 
deemed to be unethical. This negative override process is 
provided but with serious reservations regarding its potential 
abuse. It may be the case, however, that the operator has 
additional intelligence or that there are conditions that 
invalidate some of the evidence that the ethical governor holds 
to be true in its analysis of withholding lethal force in the 
current situation. Nonetheless the process should not be 
undertaken lightly, and as the ethical architecture becomes 
more sophisticated in future combat situations it may be that 
the ultimate authority for not engaging a target should vest 
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                                (D)                                                              (E)                                                               (F) 
Figure 8.  Positive Override Process.  
(A) Operator Key entry. (B) Information and responsibility acceptance. (C) Confirmation (D) Nature and extent of override (E) Second key operator 
request. (F) Positive override granted.  
 
the human, due to the manifold reasons cited in [4]. But for 
now we will relegate the ultimate authority for lethal force to 
the operator, by allowing him/her to override any decision that 
the ethical governor arrives at. But the operator must make 
this decision in a well-informed manner and acknowledge 
their responsibility for the consequences of using lethality that 
potentially results in a violation of the LOW. 
   Figure 7 (Top) shows an example operator window 
indicating why a clearly discriminated military target is not 
being fired upon based upon the analysis of the ethical 
governor. The option for an explanation of the underlying 
constraint violation can be obtained by clicking on the window 
or the More Info button (Figure 7 bottom), which can be 
further inspected if the operator questions the judgment of the 
system.  
   A positive override is deliberately not offered to the operator 
and can only be requested through a non-obvious set of 
keystrokes, simplified in our example to a right mouse click. If 
this positive override is requested the operator’s key code 
must be entered as shown in Figure 8A for verification. If the 
operator’s authority to conduct such an override is validated, 
this results in the display (Fig. 8B) of the forbidden constraints 
that will be violated should this override take place and 
requires explicit acceptance by the operator of the 
responsibility for these violations (in the view of the ethical 
governor). Secondary confirmation is then required (Fig. 8C). 
If granted, the duration of the override must then be specified 
(Fig. 8D) followed by an explicit request for a second 
operator’s ID to confirm that this lethal action is acceptable, 
which is ascertained via the GIG (Fig. 8E). A lone operator 
cannot engage a target that is deemed unethical by the 
governor: two-key authorization is required.  Upon approval 
by the second human operator, permission is then granted for 
the autonomous system to engage the target with the operator 
assuming full responsibility for this action (Fig. 8F). The 
system then begins its countdown as before. 
   Immediately upon weapons release the PTF variable is set to 
FALSE until a battle damage assessment (BDA) is completed. 
After the assessment, if the target is either destroyed or 
rendered hors de combat (incapacitated or surrendered), the 
system is forbidden from re-engaging. If the BDA indicates 
that the target is still active, the process repeats with a 
reassessment of the changing conditions by the ethical 
governor. If the lethal action remains not forbidden and still 
obligated, a re-initiation of the weapon release countdown 
begins. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
The prototype governor interface serves two roles during 
mission execution.  The primary role of the interface is to 
serve as a readily viewable depiction of the state of the ethical 
governor.  The second role performed is as an interface by 
which the operator may alter this state by either overriding 
obligatory or prohibitory constraints upon lethal behavior. 
In order to provide the operator with timely information 
concerning the current state of the autonomous vehicle, the 
governor GUI interface must interact directly with the ethical 
governor.  This interaction takes two forms.  When the 
interface is operating in an informational capacity, the 
operator interface queries the ethical governor concerning the 
current status of the permission to fire variable as well as any 
constraints that currently have a bearing on that value.  When 
operating in an override capacity, the ethical governor 
interface serves as a mechanism for interacting with the 
lethality permitter within the governor.  An overview of the 
architectural relationship between the operator interface and 
the relevant components of the ethical governor is shown in 




 From the point of view of the governor’s architecture, the 
operator interface interacts with the component termed the 
operator interface module.  The operator interface module 
serves as the gateway between the operator display and the 
ethical governor.  In order to provide the current system state 
for display, this interface module is responsible for querying 
the lethality permitter concerning the current state of the 
permission to fire variable.  Simultaneously, the operator 
interface module also requests the set of constraints that 
currently influence the value of the Permission-To-Fire (PTF) 
variable from the constraint interpreter.  If permission to fire is 
currently granted, the influencing constraints are the 
obligating constraints that are currently satisfied (as computed 
by the constraint interpreter).  The precise mechanism by 
which the constraint interpreter does this is described in detail 
in [13].   If permission to fire is denied, those relevant are the 
currently satisfied prohibitory constraints.  At predetermined 
intervals (typically 1 Hertz) the governor interface queries the 
operator interface module for the current state of the governor.  
Upon this query, the interface module reports back the 
information collected for display to the operator. The dataflow 
for this operation is shown in Figure 10. 
   When the operator requests an ethical override of the 
governor, this request is also ferried through the operator 
interface module.  The data flow for an override operation is 
shown in Figure 11. Once the operator has followed the 
necessary procedures for overriding the governor, and if 
necessary, notification of the override has been sent and 
approval has been received, the override itself is performed by 
interacting directly with the PTF variable located in the 
lethality permitter.   An overview of the interaction between 
the override and the possible values of the permission to fire 
variable is depicted earlier in Table 1.  
If the resulting value of the PTF variable is false after the 
override, the system disengages with the current target.  If the 
value of the PTF variable becomes true, the system initiates 
engagement with the current target.  Once an override has 
been initiated, the lethality permitter is also responsible for 
terminating the override upon the proper condition (e.g. via 
timeout or weapon release as specified by the operator).  After 
the override is completed, the ethical governor returns to 
normal operation. 
VI. DEMONSTRATION SCENARIO 
   The prototype governor interface and override process were 
evaluated within a variety of scenarios to ensure its proper 
operation in terms of informing the operator of the current 
status of the ethical governor as well as proper operator 
notification upon override initiation.  Only one of these 
scenarios is described below.  In this scenario, inspired by real 
world events (see Scenario 2 in [4]) several insurgents have 
been found placing improvised explosive devices along the 
roadside and a rotary  unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has 
been dispatched to engage those combatants (Fig. 12).  A 
video depicting this scenario can be found at 
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-
lab/ethics/PTF_Interface_Final_Large.mpg which is required 
viewing to fully understand the overall override process, 
which the printed page resists depicting. 
   During this demonstration scenario, the rotary UAV engages 
and successfully neutralizes two of the enemy combatants.  
When the UAV initiates engagement with one of the vehicles 
used to transport the insurgents, the operator initiates an 
obligatory override to ensure that the contents of the vehicle 
may be preserved for later intelligence purposes.  When 
subsequently engaging the final combatant, the UAV appears 
to seriously wound the target, making that target hors de 
combat according to the laws of war. As a result, re-
engagement of the target is prohibited by the ethical governor 
and Permission-To-Fire is false. Additional intelligence 
provided by incoming medics, however, indicated that the 
enemy is feigning injury and is preparing to attack the 
incoming medics.  The operator then initiates a positive 
override.  Once the operator has assumed responsibility for the 
override and the second key confirmation is received, PTF is 
set to true and the UAV engages the combatant once more.  In 
this and the other scenarios tested, the interface to the ethical 
governor successfully served as both a mechanism for 
informing the operator about the state of the governor and as a 
means of overriding the governor when necessary.  At all 
times, in this scenario and for all those tested, the operator was 
directly informed of the state of the system in terms of 
potential lethal behavior, the reasons for this state, and ensured 
that any violations of ethical constraints were the result of a 
well-defined override procedure in which the operator 
assumes responsibility for those violations.  
 
Figure 9. Simplified architectural diagram showing the relevant subsystems within the ethical governor which interact with the operator interface. The 
operator interface interacts directly with the operator interface module which communicates with two of the governor sub-systems.  The constraint 
interpreter passes the interface information concerning the current constraints that result in permission to fire being granted or denied.  Overrides 





Figure 10. Data flow for state information display.  The operator 
interface module polls the current value of the permission to fire variable 
from the lethality permitter and the constraints that currently influence 
that value from the constraint interpreter.  When polled by the operator 
interface, the interface module passes back this information for display. 
 
Figure 11. Data flow for governor override.  When an override has been 
approved, the override takes place through direct interaction with the 
permission to fire variable located within the lethality permitter 
 
 
Figure 12. One of the scenarios used to verify the operation of the 
governor interface and control flow of the override process.  Video of this 




[1] Arkin, R.C., "Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a 
Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture - Part I: Motivation 
and Philosophy", Proc. Human-Robot Interaction 2008, March 2008.  
[2] Arkin, R.C., "Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a 
Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture - Part II: Formalization 
for Ethical Control", Proc. 1st Conference on Artificial General 
Intelligence, Memphis, TN, March 2008.  
[3] Arkin, R.C., "Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a 
Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture - Part III: 
Representational and Architectural Considerations", Proceedings of 
Technology in Wartime Conference, Palo Alto, CA, January 2008.  
[4] Arkin, R.C., Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, 
Chapman and Hall, 2009. 
[5] Sparrow, R., "Killer Robots”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 24, 
No.1, 2006. 
[6] Asaro, P., “How Just Could a Robot War Be?”, presentation at 5th 
European Computing and Philosophy Conf., Twente, NL June 2007. 
[7] Perri 6, “Ethics, Regulation and the New Artificial Intelligence, Part II: 
Autonomy and Liability”, Information, Communication and Society, 4:3, 
pp. 406-434, 2001. 
[8] Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars, 4th Ed., Basic Books, 1977. 
[9] United States Army Field Manual FM 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare, 
July 1956, (amended 1977). 
[10] Moshkina, L. and Arkin, R.C., “Lethality and Autonomous Systems: 
The Roboticist Demographic”, Proc. IEEE International Symposium on 
Technology and Society, Fredericton, CA, June 2008b. 
[11] DOD (Department of Defense), Unmanned Systems Safety Guide for 
DOD Acquisition, June 27 2007a. 
[12] Arkin, R.C., Wagner, A.R., and Duncan, B., “Responsibility and 
Lethality for Unmanned Systems: Ethical Pre-mission Responsibility 
Advisement”, Proc. 2009 IEEE Workshop on Roboethics, May 2009. 
[13] Arkin, R.C., Ulam, P., and Duncan, B., An Ethical Governor for 
Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System.  Tech. Report No. 
GIT-GVU-09-02). GVU Center, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009. 
[14] Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law - The Conduct of Armed 
Conflict and Air Operations, pp. 15-16, Nov. 1976. 
[15] Toner, J.H., “Military OR Ethics”, Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 
2003. 
[16] May, L., “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception”, in The 
Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Eds. L. May, 
E. Rovie, and S. Viner, 2005), pp. 430-439, 2004. 
[17] Matthias, A., “The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the 
Actions of Learning Automata”, Ethics and Information Technology, 
Vol. 6, pp. 175-183. 
[18] Arkin, R.C. and Ulam, P., “An Ethical Adaptor: Behavioral 
Modification Derived from Moral Emotions”, Proc. CIRA-09, Daejon, 
KR, 2009. 
[19] Martin, M.S., “Rules of Engagement For Land Forces: A Matter of 
Training, Not Lawyering”, Military Law Review, Vol. 143, pp. 4-168, 
Winter 1994. 
[20] MacKenzie, D., Arkin, R.C., and Cameron, J. “Multiagent Mission 
Specification and Execution”. Autonomous Robots, 4(1), Jan 1997, pp. 
29-57. 
[21] Georgia Tech Mobile Robot Laboratory, Manual for MissionLab 
Version 7.0, 2007. 
 
 
